An abstract semantics of speculative execution for reasoning about
  security vulnerabilities by Colvin, Robert J. & Winter, Kirsten
ar
X
iv
:2
00
4.
00
57
7v
1 
 [c
s.P
L]
  1
0 M
ar 
20
20
An abstract semantics of speculative execution
for reasoning about security vulnerabilities
Robert J. Colvin and Kirsten Winter
Defence Science and Technology Group, Australia, and
School of Information Technology and Electrical Engineering
University of Queensland
Abstract. Reasoning about correctness and security of software is in-
creasingly difficult due to the complexity of modern microarchitectural
features such as out-of-order execution. A class of security vulnerabili-
ties termed Spectre that exploits side effects of speculative, out-of-order
execution was announced in 2018 and has since drawn much attention.
In this paper we formalise speculative execution and its side effects with
the intention of allowing speculation to be reasoned about abstractly
at the program level, limiting the exposure to processor-specific or low-
level semantics. To this end we encode and expose speculative execution
explicitly in the programming language, rather than solely in the op-
erational semantics; as a result the effects of speculative execution are
captured by redefining the meaning of a conditional statement, and in-
troducing novel language constructs that model transient execution of
an alternative branch. We add an abstract cache to the global state of
the system, and derive some general refinement rules that expose cache
side effects due to speculative loads. Underlying this extension is a se-
mantic model that is based on instruction-level parallelism. The rules
are encoded in a simulation tool, which we use to analyse an abstract
specification of a Spectre attack and vulnerable code fragments.
1 Introduction
Modern multicore architectures exhibit several features to speed up execution:
commands may appear to occur out of order, allowing computation to proceed
past some bottleneck (e.g., loading a value from memory), several levels of faster
intermediate memory (caches) to speed up repeated accesses, and in particular,
speculative execution, where a branch is optimistically executed, even though
local computation may not yet have determined if it is the correct branch. Such
features are difficult to reason about, though there has been significant work in
understanding weak memory models [37,2,36,1,15,23] and also detailed formal
microarchitectural models (e.g., [4]).
Recently several significant security vulnerabilities have been found related
to out-of-order execution, e.g., Meltdown [28], Foreshadow [5], and Spoiler [22].
In this paper we focus on the recently published Spectre class of attacks [25,24].
Spectre differs in that the attack may target the victim’s code to retrieve private
information, while other attacks exploit processor features only. While complex
to exploit, Spectre is a vulnerability present in almost all modern architectures.
It allows malicious code to access the memory of a victim process, potentially
reading private data, without sharing the virtual memory space. The attack
works by detecting footprints in the cache left by speculative execution; for
instance, a branch that includes a bounds check on an index i into an array A
may speculatively load the element at A[i ], before it knows for certain that i
is within the bounds of A. Though the speculative computations leading up to
the point where the mis-speculation is detected are discarded, depending on the
subsequent access patterns there may still be an effect on the cache, which is not
discarded, and which can be used to infer the value in memory at out-of-bounds
address A[i ].
In earlier work we have proposed a semantic framework to support reasoning
about weak memory models [12] which is implemented in a simulation/model
checking tool based on Maude [8]. In this paper we extend this framework with
a model of cache behaviour and speculative execution. Although Spectre may
occur in memory models that provide sequential consistency, a weak memory
model framework is a natural fit for speculative execution as speculated instruc-
tions may begin out of order, i.e., before the relevant branch is reached. This
enables not only a close inspection of Spectre-like attacks but also the analysis
of other related potential vulnerabilities that may arise in modern hardware ar-
chitectures. Our intention for the semantics is to allow analysis of vulnerability
to Spectre-like attacks to be integrated within a more general, software-level
reasoning framework; we do not aim to precisely model the implementation of
speculative execution or caches for a particular architecture.
Speculative execution presents several challenges. Firstly, it requires a model
of the cache which, for our concerns, needs to be modelled at a level that presents
enough details to realistically capture the effects of speculative execution, but is
abstract enough to not over-complicate reasoning. Secondly, speculative execu-
tion should allow side effects to take effect before the relevant branch is reached.
Thirdly, speculation can be nested, and the target of future branches may depend
on speculatively executed computations, necessitating the creation of transient
state that can be easily discarded. Finally, we want to be able to model and
explore possible mitigations, e.g., memory barriers to halt speculation, such as
Intel’s LFENCE instruction [21, Sect. 11.4.4.3].
The paper is structured as follows: in Sect. 2 we summarise a wide-spectrum
language and its semantics for reasoning about weak memory models. In Sect. 3
we extend this with new constructs for reasoning about speculative execution,
and give its semantics. We formalise some attacker and victim patterns, in par-
ticular those of Spectre, in Sect. 4. Related work is discussed in Sect. 5.
2 Background: IMP-ro
A wide-spectrum language for reasoning about weak memory models, IMP-ro, is
introduced in [12,11]. It is essentially an imperative language with assignments,
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conditionals and loops, with the difference that instead of sequential composition
(c1 ; c2 for ci a command) it has prefixing, α ; c, where α is an instruction (as
in process algebras such as CSP [20] and CCS [31]). The semantics of prefixing
is defined so that either α may be executed, or some instruction β from within
c may be executed, provided that β can be reordered before α according to the
rules of the memory model. To instantiate IMP-ro for a particular memory model
a “reordering relation”
r
⇐ on instructions is defined, stating when instructions
can occur out of order; in addition, different models may also have different
instruction types, for instance, memory barriers for enforcing order.
We recap IMP-ro below, before extending it to include speculative execution
in later sections. We ground our work in a weak memory framework because
speculation can occur before preceding instructions are executed, even when
speculative execution is implemented on architectures which enforce sequential
consistency. In addition, it appears that increasingly security vulnerabilities will
be found due to instruction reordering on modern architectures, e.g., [22]. How-
ever, the particular reordering relation is not important for the analysis in this
paper, and to avoid distraction we mostly assume sequential consistency.
The elements of IMP-ro are actions (instructions) α, commands (programs)
c, processes (local state and a command) p, and the top level system s , en-
compassing a shared state and all processes. We assume a set of variables Var ,
divided into locals (registers) and globals. By convention we use r , r1, r2, etc., to
name local variables, and unless otherwise stated, x , y, z for global variables. A
state σ is a mapping from Var to values, with the notation σ[x := v ] representing
an update of σ to map x to v . Below x is a variable (shared or local) and e an
expression.
α ::= x := e | [e]
c ::= nil | α ; c | α  c | c1 ⊓ c2 | while b do c
p ::= (local σ • c)
s ::= (global σ • p1 ‖ p2 ‖ . . .)
An action may be an update x := e or a guard [e]. For weak memory models
the set of actions may also include fences (memory barriers); we introduce an
abstract barrier in later sections. Commands include the terminated command
nil, prefixing, choice, and iteration. We also include the abstract command type
for “true prefixing”, α  c, where reordering is forbidden, i.e.,  is prefixing in
the usual CSP [20] and CCS [31] sense. For brevity, for a command α ; β ; nil
we omit the trailing nil and just write α ; β. A process encapsulates a command
within a local state σ (total on local variables), representing registers. A system
is structured as the parallel composition of processes sharing a global state, each
with their own values for local variables.
A relevant subset of the operational rules are given in Fig. 1. Transitions are
labelled with the syntax of the transition, i.e., assignments and guards, with the
addition of the silent label τ , modelling an internal step of a process with no
effect on the context. For brevity and ease of explanation we tend to focus on
rules involving guards of a particular form, [x = v ], which represents a load of x
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Rule 1 (Prefix)
(α ; c)
α
−→ c (a)
c
β
−→ c′ α
r
⇐ β〈α〉
(α ; c)
β〈α〉
−−−→ (α ; c′)
(b)
Rule 2 (Choice)
c ⊓ d
τ
−→ c
c ⊓ d
τ
−→ d
Rule 3 (While)
while b do c
τ
−→ if b then (c ; while b do c) else nil
Rule 4 (Locals)
c r := v−−−→ c′
(local σ • c)
τ
−→ (local σ[r := v] • c
′)
Rule 5 (Locals/store)
c x := r−−−→ c′ σ(r) = v
(local σ • c) x := v−−−→ (local σ • c′)
Rule 6 (Locals/load)
c r := x−−−→ c′
(local σ • c)
[x=v]
−−−→ (local σ[r := v] • c
′)
Rule 7 (Locals/guard)
c
[e]
−−→ c′
(local σ • c)
[eσ]
−−→ (local σ • c′)
Rule 8 (Parallel)
p1
α
−→ p′1
p1 ‖ p2
α
−→ p′1 ‖ p2
p2
α
−→ p′2
p1 ‖ p2
α
−→ p1 ‖ p
′
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Rule 9 (Globals/store)
p x := e−−−→ p′
(global σ • p)
τ
−→ (global σ[x := eσ ] • p
′)
Rule 10 (Globals/load)
p
[x=v]
−−−→ p′ σ(x) = v
(global σ • p)
τ
−→ (global σ • p′)
Fig. 1. Semantics of the language
when x = v . The more general rules are given in [12]. We omit some rules, such
as terminating rules like (local σ • nil)
τ
−→ nil.
Rule 1 is the key rule that allows later instructions to happen earlier, ac-
cording to an architecture-specific reordering relation
r
⇐. For instance, for TSO,
the main part of the reordering relation is that loads can come before stores,
i.e., x := 1
r
⇐ r := y, while α 6
r
⇐ β for all other instruction types. Relations for
TSO, ARM and POWER are given in [12]. To avoid distraction in this paper we
assume sequential consistency, i.e., α 6
r
⇐ β for the basic instruction types, with
the exception that τ steps can be reordered (allowing future local calculations to
be executed ahead of time). In Rule 1 the notation β〈α〉 accounts for forwarding,
where in a case such as x :=1 ; r :=x the instruction r :=x can take effect before
x := 1 provided the value 1 is forwarded to r , meaning that r := 1 is executed
(rather than r := x , which it would not be sensible to execute before x := 1 from
a sequential semantics perspective). Forwarding is defined straightforwardly in
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[12], and we do not repeat it here. The semantics for true prefixing, α  c, is
given by an equivalent version of Rule 1(a).
Rule 2 is straightforward for nondeterministic choice. In Rule 3 we unfold a
loop into a conditional; the definition of conditional in a speculative context is
crucial and is deferred until Sect. 3.2. Rule 4 covers the case of some change to
the local registers. This is an internal step of the process and is a silent τ step at
the global level. Rule 5 applies when a store x := r is executed by a process: the
local value v for r is substituted so that the label x :=v is promoted to the global
state (this rule can be generalised to cover any assignment of the form x := e
[10]). Rule 6 states that when a load r := x instruction is executed internally it
becomes a load of x , i.e., a guard [x = v ], for any value v . Although there is a
transition [x = v ] for every possible v , only the guard with the correct value for
x will be possible at the system level (via Rule 10). The loaded value becomes
the new value for r in the local state. Rule 7 states that a guard is evaluated
with respect to the registers, and is promoted for evaluation with respect to the
global state. Rule 8 gives the usual interleaving model of concurrency. Rules 9
and 10 straightforwardly update and access the global store via promoted stores
(Rule 5) and loads (Rule 6).1
Refinement (⊑) is defined so that c ⊑ d iff all terminating traces of d are also
traces of c, ignoring subsequences of internal (τ) steps. Terminating traces are
those retrieved from the operational semantics where eventually nil is reached.
(For simplicity we ignore non-terminating behaviours, that is, for this paper we
consider only partial correctness, which is sufficient for detecting Spectre-like
attacks.) Note that if a behaviour is blocked (no rules are applicable, e.g., a
false guard) it is not considered terminating. This eliminates behaviours where
the wrong branch is incorrectly taken (as opposed to incorrectly speculated), as
discussed in more detail in [12].
We lift reasoning from the operational to refinement level via Law 11, which
allows us to straightforwardly derive Law 13. More specific laws may also be
straightforwardly derived, such as resolving nondeterminism via Law 12, and
Law 14 that hides local effects, exposing a process’s global effect; this helps later
to abstract from the details of transient speculative contexts.
c
α
−→ c′ ⇛ c ⊑ α  c′ (11)
c1 ⊓ c2 ⊑ c1 (12)
α ; c ⊑ α  c (13)
(local {r 7→ 1} • x := r) ⊑ x := 1 (14)
3 Caches in weak memory models: IMP-ro-spec
From the perspective of functional correctness, speculative execution may be
ignored: in the case where a process speculates along the branch that is eventually
taken (after the conditional is evaluated) implementations ensure that speculated
instructions are committed in a consistent order; and when speculation was
1 In this paper we assume a multicopy atomic storage system; for memory models
which lack this (e.g., POWER) the storage system described in [12] may be used.
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down the incorrect branch any speculative computation is discarded. However,
as revealed by Spectre and other vulnerabilities, incorrect speculation can have
side effects, and in this section we extend IMP-ro to expose them.
For convenience we call the extended language IMP-ro-spec, which defines
conditionals to expose (incorrect) speculative execution, and records operations
on the cache in a global variable. Speculation occurs within a transient context,
which is discarded if speculation is found to be incorrect.
3.1 Syntax of IMP-ro-spec
Speculative execution. We introduce three new commands to capture spec-
ulative execution in IMP-ro.
α ::= . . . | specfence (15)
c ::= . . . | spec(c) | c1 △ c2 | (buf σ • c) (16)
c˜ =̂ (buf ∅ • (local σ • c)) (17)
if b then c1 else c2 =̂ spec(c˜2)△ ([b] ; c1) ⊓ spec(c˜1)△ ([¬b] ; c2) (18)
The instruction type specfence blocks load speculation; this is an abstract
command type that may correspond to, for instance, the LFENCE command of
Intel architectures [21]. We include it to demonstrate the relevance of reordering
relations and how mitigation techniques can be considered in our framework.
A speculation command spec(c) gives the effect of executing command c spec-
ulatively, that is, no effects on the global or local state can be seen, however,
there can be cache side effects based on the steps of c. A partial pre-execution
command c1 △ c2 partially executes c1 before c2 begins. The initial command
c1 may not execute at all, execute to completion, or partially execute. It is the
well-known CSP “interrupt” operator, but we rename it in this context to avoid
confusion with hardware interrupts. The transient buffer command (buf σ • c)
is used to keep track of modifications to globals executed speculatively.
We also introduce the abbreviation c˜ which creates the transient context for a
speculative execution of c, that is, a (temporary) mapping of (all) registers, and
an initially empty transient buffer (17). The values for the speculative copy of
registers σ created here is left unconstrained and may differ to the actual local
state in the outer context; this accounts for different strategies that different
architectures may take. Because the specifics of the local state are not relevant
for reasoning about Spectre we do not model a specific strategy, which could be
given by adding an explicit transition that sets up the local state according to the
current context. A speculative execution of code c is of the form spec(buf σb •
(local σl • c)), where a copy of the locals is encapsulated in σl , stores to globals
are encapsulated in σb , and the outer speculative command generates the cache
side effects. An example of how they interact is given in Sect. 3.3.
Speculation is evident at branch points, and hence we model conditionals
differently. Whereas in [12] a conditional if b then c1 else c2 was defined in the
standard way as ([b] ; c1)⊓([¬b] ; c2) here we extend the definition to potentially
pre-execute speculation down the alternative branches as given in (18). This says
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there are two possibilities: speculatively execute the second branch (ignoring
the guard) up until the point where the first branch is chosen, or speculatively
execute the first branch until the point the second branch is chosen. These
two possibilities cover all behaviours relevant in the context of Spectre; as far
as is known speculation down the eventually correct branch has no impact on
the security of the system that is not already visible through other analysis
techniques, e.g., information flow [33]. However, speculation down the correct
branch is straightforward to capture, as discussed in Appendix A.
To explain the relevance of the transient context (initialised in (17)) consider
the execution of spec(x := 1 ; r := x ; . . .). The effect of x := 1 must not be seen
globally (as it is difficult to unwind), however during speculation r must use the
value 1. If instead r was to use a value of x loaded from main memory this would
violate local consistency (see [1]). This detail is especially important if r is used
in later (speculated) calculations, including future branches. In our approach it
emerges from the semantics that x is not loaded nor drawn into the cache during
speculation of the above code. A purely syntactic approach to determining the
effect of speculative execution might conclude that x is added to the cache, and
hence could be overly pessimistic from a security analysis perspective.
Nested speculation, which may arise from nested conditionals or a speculated
loop, is straightforward in our framework; a new, nested, transient context is
created, and if an inner speculation attempts to load a global which the outer
speculation has buffered then the cache effect is removed (see Rule 24(e)).
The cache. The cache is modelled as a single global variable cache, kept in
the shared state, which holds a set of type Addr , representing addresses (for this
work we do not care what values are in the cache; however it is straightforward to
modify the type of cache). We assume an uninterpreted function &:Var → Addr
such that &x returns the address of the (global) variable x . We introduce three
operations on cache to model cache side channels abstractly: cache fetching
(adding something to the cache), cache clearing (clearing the (entire) cache),
and cache querying (checking if an address is in the cache). Other explicit cache
operations could be added, but these are sufficient for modelling the attack
patterns utilised to instrument Spectre attacks [25].
cache += x =̂ cache := cache ∪ {&x} (19)
cclear =̂ cache :=∅ (20)
x ∈ cache⇔ &x ∈ cache (21)
As these are abbreviations for updates to and guards on a global variable they
fit in with the framework introduced in Sect. 2. A cache fetch represents the side
effect of a speculated load. The instruction cclear captures abstractly flushing
as well as eviction of particular cache lines as it ensures that a certain address
is not present in the cache any more.
The variable cache is kept in the global state and hence is shared between all
processes. An alternative would be to explicitly model it as a separate construct,
7
e.g., (cch C • c) where C is a set of addresses. This approach would allow more
fine-grained control over cache levels, e.g., each process could have its own L1
cache, with some subset sharing an L2 cache, with the L3 cache at the top level.
(cch L3 • (cch L2a • (cch L11 • p1) ‖ (cch L12 • p2)) ‖ (cch L2b • . . .))
We are interested in the worst case behaviour of the cache, where it leaks private
information, and are not concerned with the specifics of how that may happen.
However details of the cache, such as its update policy, may also be captured
with extra machinery. In that sense our model of the cache is an abstraction of
the underlying microarchitecture implementation, which could be verified using
data and action refinement techniques [19,32,3].
3.2 Semantics of IMP-ro-spec
Partial pre-execution. The semantics of a partial pre-execution process is
based on that of the interrupt operator from CSP [20].
Rule 22 (Partial pre-execution)
c1
α
−→ c′1
c1 △ c2
α
−→ c′1 △ c2
(a)
c2
α
−→ c′2
c1 △ c2
α
−→ c′2
(b)
For commands of the form spec(c)△d the speculation of c occurs for some period
of time (Rule 22(a)) before discarding the computation and starting down the d
branch (Rule 22(b)). The arbitrariness of when c2 starts captures the unknown
time at which speculation may be found to be incorrect. We make use of the
following law that covers the interruption occurring after a single action.
(α  c1)△ c2 ⊑ α  c2 (23)
Transient buffers. Transient buffers catch stores and record them in a state;
recorded values may be used for speculative computations.
Rule 24 (Buffer)
c
x := v−−−−→ c′
(buf σ • c)
τ
−→ (buf σ[x := v ] • c
′)
(a)
c
[x=v ]
−−−−→ c′ (x 7→ v) ∈ σ
(buf σ • c)
τ
−→ (buf σ • c′)
(b)
c
[x=v ]
−−−−→ c′ x 6∈ dom(σ)
(buf σ • c)
[x=v ]
−−−−→ (buf σ • c′)
(c)
c
cache += x−−−−−−−→ c′ x ∈ dom(σ)
(buf σ • c)
τ
−→ (buf σ • c′)
(d)
c
cache += x−−−−−−−→ c′ x 6∈ dom(σ)
(buf σ • c) cache += x−−−−−−−→ (buf σ • c′)
(e)
Rule 24(a) states that (speculated) stores are recorded in the transient buffer;
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Rule 24(b) states that (speculated) loads are serviced by the buffer (similar to
forwarding [12]) if a value is available; Rule 24(c) states that otherwise the load is
promoted (to be handled by the global state via Rule 10). In cases where nested
speculation has resulted in a cache fetch, Rule 24(d), similarly to Rule 24(b),
hides a fetch of x if a store of x is in the buffer already; Rule 24(e) states that
otherwise the cache fetch is promoted. In addition a transient buffer command
promotes other instruction types not covered above (e.g., τ , specfence), and
the rules do not need to cover registers since the transient buffer encloses a local
state (17).
Speculation (down an incorrect path). Speculation should have no observ-
able effect on registers or globals (the “CPU state”), however in reality it may
leave a footprint in the cache. The main concept is to make explicit a cache fetch
with each speculated load.
Rule 25 (Speculative context)
c
[x=v ]
−−−−→ c′
spec(c) cache += x−−−−−−−→ ([x = v ] ; spec(c′))
(a)
c
τ
−→ c′
spec(c)
τ
−→ spec(c′)
(b)
c
cache += x−−−−−−−→ c′
spec(c) cache += x−−−−−−−→ spec(c′)
(c) spec(nil)
τ
−→ nil (d)
Rule 25(a) states that speculated loads of global variables have an initial side
effect on the cache. The load is delayed until after the cache fetch. Rule 25(b)
states that speculative execution can perform local computation. Rule 25(c)
states that cache fetches are promoted (from nested speculation). Rule 25(d)
states that speculation may silently complete. By omission, i.e., since there is
no corresponding rule, speculation is blocked if c executes a specfence com-
mand. We do not need to consider further action types, since speculation always
encompasses a transient context out of which only loads and cache fetches are
exposed.
Reordering of cache instructions. The semantics of IMP-ro is instantiated
for a particular memory model by defining the relation
r
⇐, as used in Rule 1(b).
We must therefore define the cases under which the new (cache-based) instruc-
tion types can be reordered. The concept of speculative execution is that loads
can be initiated ahead of time, though they must still (appear to) conform to
the particular memory model. However the cache fetches are not so constrained.
We therefore allow cache fetch instructions to be reordered before the majority
of instruction types.
y := e
r
⇐ cache += x iff x , y distinct (26)
specfence 6
r
⇐ r := x specfence 6
r
⇐ cache += x (27)
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Equation (26) states that a cache fetch of x may occur earlier than loads, and
stores of other variables (note that x := 1 6
r
⇐ cache += x as the assignment will
service the corresponding load, rather than memory). Equation (27) states that
specfence instructions block loads and cache fetches. A potential mitigation
for the Spectre vulnerability (short of turning off speculation entirely) is to
insert (concrete) specfence instructions at the start of each potentially affected
branch. However, this would have too great an impact on processor speed to be
seriously considered as a blanket fix [30].
As an example of out-of-order execution with cache side effects consider a
command of the following form, where li are loads and si are store instructions
to distinct locations.
l1 ; l2 ; (if b then l3 ; s1 else s2 ; l4)
Speculation allows cache fetches to come earlier (out-of-order), although whether
the loads themselves can come earlier than preceding loads depends on the archi-
tecture; ARM and POWER allow loads to be reordered, whereas TSO doesn’t
[37,1]. Let c3 be the cache fetch corresponding to load l3. One possible behaviour,
where the true branch is speculated before the false branch is executed, is given
by the following sequence, which exposes the cache fetch for l3.
c3  l1  l2  l3  [¬b]  s2  l4
The cache fetch for l3 occurs before the earlier loads, which, for some execution-
and architecture-specific reason, have taken longer to resolve. Note l3 itself occurs
in an order consistent with the memory model.
For simplicity we enforce ordering on cache operations, though the framework
is flexible (for instance, on Intel architectures cache flush instructions do not
necessarily prevent pre-fetching [21]).
α 6
r
⇐ cclear cclear 6
r
⇐ α x ∈ cache 6
r
⇐ α α 6
r
⇐ x ∈ cache
We do not intend for these to be definitive, but rather develop a framework that
is flexible enough to cope with different models.
3.3 Example of cache side effects due to speculation
In this section we show the particular behaviour of a conditional statement,
where the true branch is (partly) speculated before the false branch begins.
We construct the true branch, branchT, so that it modifies some global x and
a register r1, before loading z into register r2 and proceeding as branch
′
T
. A
(partial) behaviour of branchT is given by (28).
branchT =̂ x := 1 ; r1 := 2 ; r2 := z ; branch
′
T
branchT
x := 1 r1 := 2 r2 := z−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ branch′
T
(28)
The trace ends with a load of z . We will take the case where globally z has the
value 42. Now consider speculating branchT.
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spec( ˜branchT)
= Set up new transient context (17)2
spec(buf ∅ • (local σ • branchT))
τ
−→
∗
From (28), locally update x by Rule 24(a) and r1 by Rule 4
spec(buf {x 7→ 1} • (local σ[r1 := 2] • r2 := z ; branch
′
T))
cache += z−−−−−−−→ Fetch z (Rule 25(a)); arbitrarily assume z is 42
[z = 42] ; spec(buf {x 7→ 1} • (local σ[r1 := 2][r2 := 42] • branch
′
T))
The cache fetch has been exposed in the trace (the corresponding load [z = 42]
is pending). We abbreviate the remaining code as branch′′
T
, and may derive (29)
by the above calculation and Law 11.
branch
′′
T
=̂ [z = 42] ; spec(buf {x 7→ 1} • (local σ[r1 := 2][r2 := 42] • branch
′
T
))
spec( ˜branchT) ⊑ cache += z  branch
′′
T
(29)
Now we show how the cache fetch in the true branch may be seen in be-
haviours where the false branch is taken.
if b then branchT else branchF
=̂ Definition 18
spec( ˜branchF)△ ([b] ; branchT) ⊓ spec( ˜branchT)△ ([¬b] ; branchF)
⊑ Arbitrarily choose false branch by Law 12
spec( ˜branchT)△ ([¬b] ; branchF)
⊑ by (29)
(cache += z  branch′′
T
)△ ([¬b] ; branchF)
⊑ by Law 23
cache += z  ([¬b] ; branchF)
From the system’s perspective the speculation has had no effect: the assignment
to x was caught in the transient buffer, and then discarded, and the computations
involving registers r1 and r2 became silent steps that did not affect the outer
state. However, the cache has (potentially) been modified.
At the system level this gives the following behaviour, assuming global state
σg satisfies σg (z ) = 42 and assuming σg(cache) = C (the value for x is irrele-
vant), and σl is the local state (mapping r1 and r2).
(global σg • (local σl • if b then branchT else branchF) ‖ . . .)
⊑ By the above derivation (note that neither σg nor σl are affected)
(global σg • (local σl • cache += z  ([¬b] ; branchF)) ‖ . . .)
⊑ Execute instruction (Rule 1(a)), (19), Rule 9
(global σg [cache :=C∪{&z}] • (local σl • [¬b] ; branchF) ‖ . . .)
The processes in ‘. . .’ could include a malicious attacker that may be able to
exploit the existence of z in the cache. We give an example of this in the next
section.
2 Note that branchT does not depend on any of the values it buffers/loads, and hence
we may choose an arbitrary local σ; for other cases the choice of σ may be important.
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The derivations above cover the situation where a single speculated load is
promoted to a cache fetch. The variant of the Spectre attack we consider in the
next section contains two speculated loads; using similar reasoning to the above
we can straightforwardly show the following.
spec( ˜r1 := x ; r2 := y)
⊑ cache += x  [x = v1] ; spec( ˜r2 := y)
⊑ cache += x  cache += y  [x = v1] ; [y = v2] ; spec(n˜il)
And hence by generalising Law 23 we may deduce the following.
spec( ˜r1 := x ; r2 := y)△ c ⊑ cache += x  cache += y  c (30)
if b then r1 := x ; r2 := y else c ⊑ cache += x  cache += y  [¬b] ; c (31)
4 Security vulnerabilities
4.1 Attack patterns
Cache-based timing attacks often utilise certain attack strategies to set up the
cache as a covert or side channel to expose secret information. Generally, an
attacker that shares a cache with a victim can observe through the variation
in access time whether a particular memory address resides in the cache (a
cache hit) and hence has been accessed previously, or not (a cache miss). To
reduce noise on this covert channel, the attacker first “clears” the cache to make
sure the memory address in question does not reside in the cache. This can be
achieved by either flushing the cache line in question (some Intel architectures
offer an instruction clflush), or by filling the cache with other content (by
accessing physically congruent addresses in a large array [17]), so that due to
the contention the memory addresses in question (if present) will be evicted.
Both these options are captured in our model through the instruction cclear
(as emptying the cache and filling the cache with other content amounts to the
same desired effect).
For example consider the following code that iterates over the elements of an
array B to determine which of B [i ] is in the cache.
Atk =̂ i := 0 ; (while i < 256 do (if B [i ] ∈ cache then r := i) ; i += 1) (32)
If the attacker is trying to determine the value of some byte of data d, then
under the assumption B [d] ∈ cache and for all i 6= d we have B [i ] 6∈ cache
then we have r = d.
The guard B [i ] ∈ cache is an abstraction of a timing attack that loads B [i ]
and checks the amount of time against an architecture-specific threshold. For
our level of analysis we do not need to explicitly model such detail, we care only
that it is possible.
Flush+Reload [46] and also Evict+Reload [17], two examples that follow
the above pattern, can be used to target the last level cache (LLC), which is
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shared between cores, and hence works on any cross-core as well as cross-VM
settings [27]. In cases where a flush instruction is not available eviction is used
to “clear” the cache. The following fundamental concepts of micro-architectures
are exploited in these attack patterns [17]: 1) the LLC is shared amongst all
CPUs; 2) the LLC is inclusive (i.e., contains all data that is stored in the L1
and L2 caches, hence modifications on the LLC influence caches on all other
cores); 3) single cache lines are shared amongst processes on the same core; and
4) programs can map any other program binary/library into their address space.
4.2 The Spectre attack
Spectre attacks typically use an attack pattern based on those described above.
Additionally to setting up the cache as a channel, the attacker (mis)trains
the branch predictor to speculate down the desired branch. Depending on the
processor-specific branch prediction mechanism used, the training can occur by
repeatedly running the code with “correct” input. When unexpectedly supplied
with an “incorrect” input, the processor will (incorrectly) speculate the desired
branch, in which secret information is loaded from memory (e.g., execute a mem-
ory access at an address that is chosen by the attacker), or in other variants the
attacker may leverage its own code to access the secret from the same process,
for instance, a webpage script run from within a browser process. In a third
phase of the attack the timing difference between a cache hit and a cache miss
is observed by the attacker, as in (32), allowing it to deduce the secret value.
An example of victim’s code that is susceptible to a Spectre attack is given
below (following [24]). Assume that the attacker wishes to know the value of
some data d, held at some address in the private space of the victim process V
and which can be retrieved via variable k, i.e., d is at address &k. The attacker
knows/calculates the address of k relative to the victim array A, which we will
call χ, loading the value into r2 via an out-of-bounds index into A. That is,
A[χ] = d. This private data is then used as an index into another array B .
V =̂ r1 := χ ; n := #A; if r1 < n then (r2 :=A[r1] ; r3 := B [r2])
We apply Law 31 to observe the potential effects of speculation.
V ⊑ r1 := χ ; n := #A ; cache += A[χ]  cache += B [d]  [r1 6< n]
(We let &A[i ] return a unique address for the array A at index i .) Let σl be
the local state for V (A, n, r1, r2, r3 ∈ dom(σl )), and σg the global state (B ∈
dom(σg), σg (cache) = C ); then we can derive the following refinement.
(global σg • (local σl • V ) ‖ p) ⊑
(global σg [cache :=C∪{&k,&B [d]}] • (local σ
′
l • nil) ‖ p)
The data d does not appear explicitly in the shared state, but indirectly through
a cache fetch. Note that the values of the variables whose addresses are in the
cache are not accessible.
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To infer d the attacker may perform an attack as given by Atk in (32). For
simplicity here we assume Atk and V share B , for instance if B is a read-only
array of data shared by processes in a system; alternatively Atk does not need
to share B , but rather know where B maps to in a shared cache, and map
an array BAtk of its own so that the addresses in the cache line up. At this
level of abstraction we do not distinguish these alternatives. To establish the
precondition that all elements of B are not in the cache the attacker sets up the
context to ensure that it executes a cclear before the victim’s code is run. For
instance, if the vulnerable code is in a function call provided by the server V ,
with the initial value of r1 passed as an argument,
(global {cache 7→ , . . .} • cclear ; V (χ) ; Atk)
This pattern can be repeated; in fact χ need not be a specific address, as data
from V ’s private space can be read consecutively byte-by-byte by incrementing
χ on each attack.
Model checking. We validated the semantics by encoding the refinement laws
as an extension to the simulation tool described in [12], which is written in the
Maude rewriting engine [8,42]. The refinement laws and auxiliary definitions
(such as
r
⇐ for cache fetches) were encoded straightforwardly. We then encoded
the Spectre attacker and victim processes, extending the array A so that its
contents went beyond its stated length to model an out-of-bounds index into
private memory; the simulation runs showed that r = d is established in the
attacker (32) in the cases where speculation is not interrupted in the victim
until after the two cache fetches.
5 Related work
Cache side channels have been studied in the past decade (see [47,16] for an
overview), and a number of tools have been developed to support the detection
of vulnerabilities (e.g., [14,44,6,39]). However, these developments predate the
publication of the Spectre vulnerability [25,24] and hence do not consider the
effects of speculative execution. Since the effects of speculation do not affect the
functional correctness of an implementation (the results of incorrect speculation
are thrown away), they could be safely ignored in earlier work on the semantics
of weak memory models (e.g., [12]). Detailed formal models of microarchitecture
describe the interaction of the cache with processors [4], but are not readily
integrated with language-level analysis techniques.
A model of speculative execution to study vulnerabilities and support the
evaluation of software mitigations is presented in [30]. That work assumes a
uniprocessor system and is not integrated with a weak memory model, and is
designed to give a precise description of the behaviour of the microarchitecture.
The work of [13] gives a model of execution that highlights speculative behaviours
by explicitly modelling executions down false branches within a partially-ordered
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multiset graph-based model. In contrast to our framework, they don’t consider
nested speculation, nor reorder speculated instructions.
A number of tools have been developed for detecting Spectre-vulnerable code
and injecting fences to mitigate the danger [43,26,45] as well as information
flow approaches to ensuring security in the presence of speculative execution
[18,7]. The operational semantics underlying these approaches is less abstract
than that presented in this paper, and the analysis is performed at the semantic
level. The key difference of our work is that we encode speculative execution at
the command level, and hence our framework supports algebraic, or refinement-
based reasoning.
The CheckMate tool [40] integrates a model of speculative execution into a
weak memory model framework [29]. Since the work aims at the verification of
microarchitectures, their model is set at that level and does not provide high-
level properties such as Law 31 to support reasoning on the program level. Their
tool is used to synthesise Spectre-style attacks and generate assembler test pro-
grams that can be used to determine if a particular processor is susceptible. We
can potentially use these test programs to investigate the security implications
within our more abstract framework. We have focused on cache effects from
speculative loads, however two variants of Meltdown and Spectre discovered by
the CheckMate tool [40,41] work from speculative stores. On architectures where
speculatively executed stores affect the cache we can adapt our semantics such
that Rule 24(a) emits the appropriate cache-modifying action (rather than being
a purely internal step).
6 Conclusion
We have captured the side effects of speculative execution down the wrong path
with a relatively small extension to an existing framework for reasoning about
weak memory models (out-of-order execution). To calculate speculated compu-
tations (beyond loads) we introduced a transient context, which is discarded
in the case of incorrect speculation. In our semantic framework, in contrast to
Plotkin-style semantics where states appear in the configuration of the opera-
tional rules [35], we expose the effect of a transition in its label. This simplifies
semantic issues concerning redeclaration of variables (see [9,10] for a further dis-
cussion); operations on variables in the inner (transient) scope become silent τ
steps that do not effect the variables in the outer scope, despite sharing the same
names. Allowing early execution of speculated instructions was straightforward
to specify in the reordering relation of IMP-ro [12].
Our intention is to allow abstract functional analysis techniques to be used
alongside security analysis techniques, reusing existing tools. In particular, the
information flow analysis framework in [34,33] has been extended to weak mem-
ory models [38] based on the reordering semantics of IMP-ro [12]. We envisage a
further extension of that work based on IMP-ro-spec to find information leaks
resulting from speculative execution. (information flow approaches to speculative
execution are also considered in [18,7]). We have aimed to provide just enough
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detail so that cache effects can be modelled, but not so much that the ability to
derive generic algebraic laws (such as Law 31) is lost.
Acknowledgements.We thank Samuel Chenoweth, Patrick Meiring, Mark
Beaumont, Harrison Cusack and the anonymous reviewers for helping us improve
the paper.
References
1. Jade Alglave, Luc Maranget, and Michael Tautschnig. Herding cats: Modelling,
simulation, testing, and data mining for weak memory. ACM Trans. Program.
Lang. Syst., 36(2):7:1–7:74, July 2014.
2. Jade Alglave, Luc Maranget, Michael Tautschnig, Susmit Sarkar, and Peter Sewell.
Litmus: Running tests against hardware. In Parosh Aziz Abdulla and K. Rustan M.
Leino, editors, Tools and Algorithms for the Construction and Analysis of Systems
(TACAS), Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 41–44. Springer, 2011.
3. R. J. R. Back and J. von Wright. Trace refinement of action systems. In Bengt
Jonsson and Joachim Parrow, editors, CONCUR ’94: Concurrency Theory, pages
367–384, Berlin, Heidelberg, 1994. Springer Berlin Heidelberg.
4. Shiji Bijo, Einar Broch Johnsen, Ka I. Pun, and S. Lizeth Tapia Tarifa. An oper-
ational semantics of cache coherent multicore architectures. In Proceedings of the
31st Annual ACM Symposium on Applied Computing, SAC ’16, pages 1219–1224,
New York, NY, USA, 2016. ACM.
5. Jo Van Bulck, Marina Minkin, Ofir Weisse, Daniel Genkin, Baris Kasikci, Frank
Piessens, Mark Silberstein, Thomas F. Wenisch, Yuval Yarom, and Raoul Strackx.
Foreshadow: Extracting the keys to the Intel SGX kingdom with transient out-of-
order execution. In USENIX Security Symposium, 2018.
6. Sudipta Chattopadhyay and Abhik Roychoudhury. Symbolic verification of cache
side-channel freedom. CoRR, abs/1801.01203, 2018.
7. K. Cheang, C. Rasmussen, S. Seshia, and P. Subramanyan. A formal approach to
secure speculation. In 2019 IEEE 32nd Computer Security Foundations Symposium
(CSF), pages 288–28815, June 2019.
8. Manuel Clavel, Francisco Duran, Steven Eker, Patrick Lincoln, Narciso Marti-Oliet,
Jose´ Meseguer, and Jose´ F. Quesada. Maude: specification and programming in
rewriting logic. Theoretical Computer Science, 285(2):187 – 243, 2002.
9. Robert Colvin and Ian J. Hayes. CSP with hierarchical state. In Michael Leuschel
and Heike Wehrheim, editors, Integrated Formal Methods (IFM 2009), volume 5423
of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 118–135. Springer, 2009.
10. Robert J. Colvin and Ian J. Hayes. Structural operational semantics through
context-dependent behaviour. Journal of Logic and Algebraic Programming,
80(7):392 – 426, 2011.
11. Robert J. Colvin and Graeme Smith. A high-level operational semantics for hard-
ware weak memory models. CoRR, abs/1812.00996, 2018.
12. Robert J. Colvin and Graeme Smith. A wide-spectrum language for verification of
programs on weak memory models. In Klaus Havelund, Jan Peleska, Bill Roscoe,
and Erik de Vink, editors, Formal Methods, pages 240–257, Cham, 2018. Springer
International Publishing.
13. C. Disselkoen, R. Jagadeesan, A. Jeffrey, and J. Riely. Code that never ran: Mod-
eling attacks on speculative evaluation. In Proc. of IEEE Symposium on Security
and Privacy (S&P), 2019. to appear.
16
14. Goran Doychev, Boris Ko¨pf, Laurent Mauborgne, and Jan Reineke. CacheAudit:
A tool for the static analysis of cache side channels. ACM Trans. Inf. Syst. Secur.,
18(1):4:1–4:32, June 2015.
15. Shaked Flur, Kathryn E. Gray, Christopher Pulte, Susmit Sarkar, Ali Sezgin, Luc
Maranget, Will Deacon, and Peter Sewell. Modelling the ARMv8 architecture,
operationally: Concurrency and ISA. In Proceedings of the 43rd Annual ACM
SIGPLAN-SIGACT Symposium on Principles of Programming Languages, POPL
’16, pages 608–621, New York, NY, USA, 2016. ACM.
16. Qian Ge, Yuval Yarom, David Cock, and Gernot Heiser. A survey of microarchi-
tectural timing attacks and countermeasures on contemporary hardware. Journal
of Cryptographic Engineering, 8(1):1–27, 2018.
17. Daniel Gruss, Raphael Spreitzer, and Stefan Mangard. Cache template attacks:
Automating attacks on inclusive last-level caches. In 24th USENIX Security Sym-
posium (USENIX Security 15), pages 897–912. USENIX Association, 2015.
18. Marco Guarnieri, Boris Ko¨pf, Jose´ F. Morales, Jan Reineke, and Andre´s Sa´nchez.
SPECTECTOR: principled detection of speculative information flows. CoRR,
abs/1812.08639, 2018.
19. Jifeng He, C.A.R. Hoare, and Jeff Sanders. Data refinement refined (resume). In
Bernard Robinet and Reinhard Wilhelm, editors, ESOP 86, volume 213 of Lecture
Notes in Computer Science, pages 187–196. Springer Berlin / Heidelberg, 1986.
20. C. A. R. Hoare. Communicating Sequential Processes. Prentice-Hall, Inc., Upper
Saddle River, NJ, USA, 1985.
21. Intel. Intel 64 and IA-32 Architectures Software Developers Manual, January 2019.
22. Saad Islam, Ahmad Moghimi, Ida Bruhns, Moritz Krebbel, Berk Gulmezoglu,
Thomas Eisenbarth, and Berk Sunar. Spoiler: Speculative load hazards boost
rowhammer and cache attacks, 2019.
23. Jeehoon Kang, Chung-Kil Hur, Ori Lahav, Viktor Vafeiadis, and Derek Dreyer.
A promising semantics for relaxed-memory concurrency. In Proceedings of the
44th ACM SIGPLAN Symposium on Principles of Programming Languages, POPL
2017, pages 175–189, New York, NY, USA, 2017. ACM.
24. Paul Kocher, Daniel Genkin, Daniel Gruss, Werner Haas, Mike Hamburg, Moritz
Lipp, Stefan Mangard, Thomas Prescher, Michael Schwarz, and Yuval Yarom.
Spectre attacks: Exploiting speculative execution. CoRR, abs/1801.01203, 2018.
25. Paul Kocher, Jann Horn, Anders Fogh, , Daniel Genkin, Daniel Gruss, Werner
Haas, Mike Hamburg, Moritz Lipp, Stefan Mangard, Thomas Prescher, Michael
Schwarz, and Yuval Yarom. Spectre attacks: Exploiting speculative execution. In
40th IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P’19), 2019.
26. P. Li, L. Zhao, R. Hou, L. Zhang, and D. Meng. Conditional speculation: An
effective approach to safeguard out-of-order execution against Spectre attacks. In
2019 IEEE International Symposium on High Performance Computer Architecture
(HPCA), pages 264–276, Feb 2019.
27. Moritz Lipp, Daniel Gruss, Raphael Spreitzer, Cle´mentine Maurice, and Stefan
Mangard. Armageddon: Cache attacks on mobile devices. In 25th USENIX Security
Symposium (USENIX Security 16), pages 549–564. USENIX Association, 2016.
28. Moritz Lipp, Michael Schwarz, Daniel Gruss, Thomas Prescher, Werner Haas, An-
ders Fogh, Jann Horn, Stefan Mangard, Paul Kocher, Daniel Genkin, Yuval Yarom,
and Michael Hamburg. Meltdown: Reading kernel memory from user space. In
USENIX Security Symposium, 2018.
29. Daniel Lustig, Michael Pellauer, and Margaret Martonosi. PipeCheck: Specify-
ing and verifying microarchitectural enforcement of memory consistency models.
17
In Proceedings of the 47th Annual IEEE/ACM International Symposium on Mi-
croarchitecture, MICRO-47, pages 635–646, Washington, DC, USA, 2014. IEEE
Computer Society.
30. Ross Mcilroy, Jaroslav Sevcik, Tobias Tebbi, Ben L. Titzer, and Toon Verwaest.
Spectre is here to stay: An analysis of side-channels and speculative execution.
CoRR, abs/1902.05178, 2019.
31. Robin Milner. A Calculus of Communicating Systems. Springer-Verlag New York,
Inc., 1982.
32. C. Morgan and P. Gardiner. Data refinement by calculation. Acta Informatica,
27:481–503, 1990.
33. Toby C. Murray, Robert Sison, and Kai Engelhardt. Covern: A logic for composi-
tional verification of information flow control. In 2018 IEEE European Symposium
on Security and Privacy, EuroS&P 2018, pages 16–30. IEEE, 2018.
34. Toby C. Murray, Robert Sison, Edward Pierzchalski, and Christine Rizkallah. Com-
positional verification and refinement of concurrent value-dependent noninterfer-
ence. In IEEE 29th Computer Security Foundations Symposium, CSF 2016, pages
417–431. IEEE Computer Society, 2016.
35. Gordon D. Plotkin. A structural approach to operational semantics. J. Log. Algebr.
Program., 60-61:17–139, 2004.
36. Susmit Sarkar, Peter Sewell, Jade Alglave, Luc Maranget, and Derek Williams.
Understanding POWER multiprocessors. SIGPLAN Not., 46(6):175–186, June
2011.
37. Peter Sewell, Susmit Sarkar, Scott Owens, Francesco Zappa Nardelli, and Mag-
nus O. Myreen. X86-TSO: A rigorous and usable programmer’s model for x86
multiprocessors. Commun. ACM, 53(7):89–97, July 2010.
38. Graeme Smith, Nicholas Coughlin, and Toby Murray. Value-dependent inform-
ation-flow security on weak memory models, 2019. To appear, Formal Methods
2019.
39. Valentin Touzeau, Claire Ma¨ıza, David Monniaux, and Jan Reineke. Fast and
exact analysis for LRU caches. Proc. ACM Program. Lang., 3(POPL):54:1–54:29,
2019.
40. Caroline Trippel, Daniel Lustig, and Margaret Martonosi. Checkmate: Auto-
mated synthesis of hardware exploits and security litmus tests. 2018 51st An-
nual IEEE/ACM International Symposium on Microarchitecture (MICRO), pages
947–960, 2018.
41. Caroline Trippel, Daniel Lustig, and Margaret Martonosi. MeltdownPrime and
SpectrePrime: Automatically-synthesized attacks exploiting invalidation-based co-
herence protocols. CoRR, abs/1802.03802, 2018.
42. Alberto Verdejo and Narciso Mart-Oliet. Executable structural operational seman-
tics in Maude. Journal of Logic and Algebraic Programming, 67(1-2):226 – 293,
2006.
43. Guanhua Wang, Sudipta Chattopadhyay, Ivan Gotovchits, Tulika Mitra, and Ab-
hik Roychoudhury. oo7: Low-overhead defense against spectre attacks via binary
analysis. CoRR, abs/1807.05843, 2018.
44. Shuai Wang, Pei Wang, Xiao Liu, Danfeng Zhang, and Dinghao Wu. CacheD:
Identifying cache-based timing channels in production software. In 26th USENIX
Security Symposium (USENIX Security 17), pages 235–252. USENIX Association,
2017.
45. Meng Wu and Chao Wang. Abstract interpretation under speculative execution.
In Proceedings of the 40th ACM SIGPLAN Conference on Programming Language
18
Design and Implementation, PLDI 2019, pages 802–815, New York, NY, USA,
2019. ACM.
46. Yuval Yarom and Katrina Falkner. FLUSH+RELOAD: A high resolution, low
noise, L3 cache side-channel attack. In USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX
Security 14), pages 719–732. USENIX Association, 2014.
47. Yinqian Zhang. Cache side channels: State of the art and research opportunities.
In Proceedings of the 2017 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Commu-
nications Security, CCS ’17, pages 2617–2619. ACM, 2017.
A Speculation down the correct branch; parallel
speculation
As far as is currently known correct speculation has no security implications,
and therefore we do not model such behaviours explicitly. However if needed we
can capture this in several ways. For instance, a cache fetch can be associated
with every load, whether inside or outside a speculation, similarly to Rule 25(a).
Such semantics can be given by annotating each load that may exhibit this side
effect.
(r := x )cache
cache += x−−−−−−−→ r := x
Alternatively we could add the possibility of speculation down the eventually
chosen branch as a choice.
spec(c2 ⊓ c1)△ ([b] ; c1) ⊓ spec(c1 ⊓ c2)△ ([¬b] ; c2)
A more precise model that commits the transient context when correct specula-
tion is found is possible, though significantly more complicated.
The concept of speculation down either branch can be extended straightfor-
wardly to parallel speculation down multiple branches, for instance,
(spec(c1) ‖ spec(c2))△ ([b] ; c1)
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